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Amnesty Now! Ending Prison 
Overcrowding through a Categorical Use 
of the Pardon Power 
 
JONATHAN SIMON* 
America’s practice of mass incarceration is coming un-
der growing criticism as fiscally unsustainable and morally 
indefensible. Chronic overcrowding of prisons, a problem 
that epitomizes the destructive and unlawful core of mass in-
carceration, now afflicts the federal prison system and 
nearly half the states. Actual reforms, however, like Presi-
dent Obama’s recent grant of clemency to forty-six federal 
prisoners serving long drug sentences for non-violent con-
duct, or recent one-off sentencing reforms aimed at prevent-
ing imprisonment for minor drug or property crimes, are 
manifestly insufficient to end mass incarceration, or even the 
chronic overcrowding that represents its most degrading 
and destructive aspect. The problem with both kinds of 
measures is that they retain two core presumptions that built 
mass incarceration in the first place. First, the “presumption 
of dangerousness” that exists against those currently or for-
merly caught up in the criminal justice system, no matter 
how minor their interaction. Second, the “presumption of 
confidence” in prosecutorial discretion to manage the huge 
portion of the population subjected to such suspicions. Both 
of these presumptions operate to narrow channels of relief 
for individual prisoners and reform for the system overall.  
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D., PH.d, Adrian Kragen Professor of Law, University of California, 
Berkeley, School of Law (Berkeley Law). 
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To overcome both of these presumptions, this essay pro-
poses a simple extension of the clemency model. The pardon-
ing power under which President Obama granted his recent 
clemencies, which is possessed by the vast majority of gov-
ernors with respect to state prisoners, permits the granting 
of relief (from partial remission of sentence to the complete 
redaction of the conviction) not only to individuals, but also 
to whole categories of prisoners. Pardon in this form, known 
generally as amnesty, has a limited history in the United 
States, but has been commonly used by European countries 
precisely to relieve problems like prison overcrowding. 
President Obama has begun to use this kind of approach to 
address the related problem of immigration and mass depor-
tation in the United States through his policy, announced in 
May 2014, that his administration would favor the granting 
of “deferred action” with respect to whole categories of 
non-citizens inside the United States and subject to deporta-
tion.  
While deferred action is not a perfect analogy for pardon 
(for one thing, it is not necessarily permanent), and while 
other aspects of the administration’s action epitomize the 
very presumptions that are blocking reform in the criminal 
justice field (particularly the blanket exclusion of so-called 
“criminal aliens”), deferred action paves the way for the 
kind of action that is necessary to overcome the toxic situa-
tion of prison overcrowding in the United States, as well as 
the larger system of mass incarceration. Amnesty measures 
are deeply problematic in advanced legal systems like in the 
United States and for good reason. However, limited appli-
cation of such measures takes inspiration from the long re-
ligious tradition of “jubilee,” and from the existing limited 
tradition of federal amnesties for those who have violated 
military service-related laws during major wars. As these 
traditions suggest, when properly used, amnesties can both 
relieve immediate problems and improve the legitimacy of 
legal systems distended by extreme conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION: CAN’T GET THERE FROM HERE 
Across nearly four decades, from the early-1970s until the mid-
2000s, the scale of incarcerations in the United States has funda-
mentally shifted from a low of around 161 prisoners per 100 thou-
sand free people in the community in 1972, to 707 prisoners per 100 
thousand in 2012, or a total of 2.23 million people.1 To achieve this 
increase, prosecutors used their broad discretion under existing laws 
to seek imprisonment,2 and lawmakers increased the severity of 
prison sentences for virtually all crimes through restating base levels 
and enacting a wide assortment of enhancements.3 A recent consen-
sus emerged that America has too many prisoners and should reduce 
its reliance on incarceration, particularly in response to low-level 
felonies involving drugs and property.4 Mass incarceration is now 
blamed for concentrating punishment on already socially and eco-
nomically marginalized minority communities,5 creating inhumane 
conditions on an industrial scale,6 and producing only modest reduc-
tions in crime at unacceptably high costs.7 But while a growing bi-
partisan coalition, unimaginable just a few years ago, is trumpeting 
the need to end mass incarceration,8 there is little evidence thus far 
                                                                                                             
 1 COMM. ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF 
INCARCERATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., THE GROWTH 
OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 13 (Jeremy Travis, et. al. eds. 2014) [hereinafter CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES]. 
 2 Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the United States: 20th 
Century Patterns and 21st Century Prospects, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1225, 1232 (2010). 
 3 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 4 MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 8 (2014) (providing a summary of how mass incarceration 
came to be viewed as a problem and limited consensus to reduce the prison pop-
ulation). 
 5 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010). 
 6 JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE 
COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 2–5 (2014). 
 7 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 51–52 
(2007). 
 8 HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 6–8 (2015). 
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that the political logics behind mass incarceration have been dimin-
ished enough to achieve this goal.9 One at a time, reforms in state 
and federal sentencing laws and increased use of executive powers 
to increase clemency and parole simply cannot overcome the inter-
locking structural power of a hyper-punitive system of sentencing 
laws and a powerful complex of law enforcement establishments 
that dominate both state and federal justice.10 Like the ambition to 
achieve interplanetary travel, the goal of eliminating mass incarcer-
ation in our time simply cannot be attained by conventional political 
and legal technologies. 
The laws and practices that sustain extraordinary incarceration 
levels in the face of chronic overcrowding, high costs, and little ev-
idence that they are necessary to keep crime low, depend not only 
on politics, but also on powerful presumptions that have become a 
“common sense” about crime, crime prevention, and prisons, ever 
since crime initially spiked in the 1960s and 1970s.11 The first one 
might be called the “presumption of dangerousness,” or the idea that 
anybody arrested on a criminal charge, no matter how minor, might 
turn out to be a really dangerous person; if a person is convicted of 
a crime, no matter how minor, that potentiality has become a likeli-
hood.12 The “presumption of dangerousness” means that while long, 
incapacitating prison terms may not be deemed necessary to protect 
the public against all the people convicted of minor felonies, it is 
necessary for some, and so a policy that favors public safety over the 
rights of people convicted of crime will err well on the side of cau-
tion.13 
The second presumption comes in here. Since even those states 
with the most willingness to build prisons and jails do not have the 
capacity to incapacitate all of the people convicted of minor crimes, 
some level of selection must be made, and the actor or institution 
                                                                                                             
 9 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 4, at 16. 
 10 The late Bill Stuntz provided a compelling analysis of this complex. BILL 
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5–7 (2011). On the con-
strains on clemency, see Rachel Barkow, Clemency and the Unitary Executive 
16–20 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 14-38, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484586. 
 11 SIMON, supra note 6, at 3–4 (describing this “common sense” and its his-
torical origins). 
 12 Id. at 4. 
 13 Id. 
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most trusted to make that selection is the prosecutor.14 This pre-
sumption is not hard to appreciate, although in its super strong form 
it does not predate the recent war on crime.15 Most prosecutor’s of-
fices are run by local District or State Attorneys who must answer 
to the voters in the competitive local elections every four years or 
so.16 For citizens anxious that powerful bureaucracies might be in-
sensitive to their vulnerabilities, there is clear appeal to a model of 
giving prosecutors power to incapacitate the right felons, and then 
punishing them at the ballot box if they fail to do so.17 Prosecutors 
are also deemed “experts” in crime by a public that does not trust 
judges or parole boards with the same discretion.18 The structural 
failures of this model, especially in its tendency to reflect the pref-
erences of suburban white middle class voters, who face relatively 
little crime risk, over inner city lower class voters of color, who face 
relatively large crime risks, are well established at this point.19 For 
our purposes, however, it is the power of elected state prosecutors, 
built up over the decades by intense legislative competition to ap-
pear tougher on crime, that compels skepticism about the ability of 
the major reform pathways to clear the backlog of over-punishment 
and place the nation on a sustainable path of reducing incarcera-
tion.20 Prosecutors, as an organized interest group, have politically 
opposed sentencing reforms in most states and have insisted on a 
                                                                                                             
 14 Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise 
of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV 1332, 1351–52 (2008). 
 15 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR 7–8 (2007) (describing the rise of the prosecutor as the most trusted political 
office); see also Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, 
Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 450–53 (2001). 
 16 Barkow, supra note 14, at 1353. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1354. 
 19 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 13; STUNTZ, supra note 10, at 2; 
Davis, supra note 15, at 443, 448; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullifica-
tion, 52 B.C.L. REV. 1243, 1268–69 (2011); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, 
The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 154–55 (2008). This is less of a problem 
where county and city voting lines are the same or where cities have their own 
prosecuting attorney. 
 20 SIMON, supra note 15, at 33–34. 
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cautious approach to efforts like President Obama’s clemency pro-
gram.21 
Together, these interlocking presumptions make it very difficult 
to fully open the channels of reform. Prosecutors oppose reforms by 
invoking both the presumption of dangerousness and the presump-
tion of confidence in their discretion. And even when they lose po-
litically, they can use that discretion to charge around established 
reforms.22 What is needed is a radical measure to force open the 
conventional channels of change, and upend the penal ideology that 
assigns an unknowable (and thus inherently frightening) degree of 
dangerousness to people who commit even minor felonies (espe-
cially if they belong to categories already perceived as high risk) and 
grants to the prosecution a presumption of suitability to exercise dis-
cretion. 
This article examines amnesty, by which I mean measures of 
collective reprieve of criminal penalties that aim to reduce the scale 
of incarceration or restore formerly incarcerated citizens to full civil 
rights and equal citizenship.23 Amnesty, while rare in the United 
States, is an internationally respected tool for addressing periods of 
excessive punitiveness and harshness driven by the exigencies of 
war.24 Mass incarceration represents just such a period of excess, 
and our forty-year-long war on crime and drugs is a real war, one 
that has profoundly shaped law and practice. 
Most states and the federal government could eliminate toxic 
prison overcrowding in a matter of months through an amnesty 
based on the pardon power of the chief executive.25 In the minority 
                                                                                                             
 21 Vivian Ho, Prop 47: Deep split over law reducing 6 felonies to misdemean-
ors, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Nov. 5, 2015, 7:34 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/S-F-district-attorney-defends-Prop-47-
which-6614091.php; Matt Ford, The Limits of Obama’s Clemency, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2014/12/the-limits-of-obama-mercy/383870/. 
 22 This may already be happening with respect to Proposition 47 in Califor-
nia. 
 23 Kent Greenawalt, Vietnam Amnesty—Problems of Justice and Line-Draw-
ing, 11 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1976). 
 24 See infra Part II.C. 
 25 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded 
Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5–7 (2013). 
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of states that do not vest such power in the hands of the chief exec-
utive, it might take legislation authorizing or mandating such an am-
nesty. These amnesties would immediately undo the ongoing harm 
to prisoners and to the legitimacy of the penal system that is caused 
by overcrowding.26 More importantly, by shattering the carceral 
consensus created by the presumption of dangerousness and the pre-
sumption of confidence in prosecutorial discretion, amnesties would 
dramatically challenge the beliefs that have shaped and preserved 
mass incarceration. 
Of course, amnesties also pose substantial dangers. In the short 
term, they could lead to crime waves, as underprepared state and 
local parole and probation agencies struggle to help thousands of 
prisoners cope with reentry.27 In the long term, they could under-
mine deterrence and the legitimacy of law more generally as citizens 
consider the possibility of future amnesties on their criminal and 
law-abiding behavior.28 A review of the history of amnesty, as well 
as a growing body of empirical research on Italy’s 2006 General 
Pardon, which resulted in more than 40 thousand prisoners being 
released over several months in an effort to relieve severe prison 
overcrowding, suggest that these risks can be managed.29 
Part I will address the temptation of more realistic paths toward 
reducing incarceration. If these paths of “ordinary” legal reform 
were as open as they have been historically, they would be suffi-
cient. Instead, they have been dramatically narrowed by the inter-
locking presumptions. These paths must be pursued but they also 
must be supplemented by efforts to use extraordinary solutions. Part 
II explores one far-from-ordinary path of reform, in the U.S. context 
(as we shall see, it has been more common elsewhere), namely gen-
eral pardons or amnesties. This practice has its origins in the theo-
logical temporality of the Torah, but was incorporated through the 
                                                                                                             
 26 Zach Hindin, A More Historic Act of Clemency, THE ATLANTIC (July 14, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/a-more-historic-act-
of-clemency/398468/. 
 27 See, e.g., Peter Popham, Mass Pardon for Convicts in Italy Leads to a 
Crime Wave, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 06 2006), http://independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/europe/mass-pardon-for-convicts-in-italy-leads-to-a-
crime-wave-410755.html. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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Church into the practice of many European Christian Kingdoms and 
into the pardoning powers of secular nation states that sprang from 
them. Part III offers an overview of how amnesties, which could be 
legislative as well as done by executive decree alone, could play an 
important role in both eliminating the immediate scourge of over-
crowding in our federal prisons and many state prison systems and 
in helping to loosen the hold of the twin presumptions on conven-
tional means of legal reforms. 
I. NARROW CHANNELS OF “ORDINARY” LEGAL REFORMS 
While extraordinary in result, there was nothing extraordinary 
or illegal about the way mass incarceration was created. It was pro-
duced through the procedurally correct production of harsh new 
laws and the legally authorized exercise of a growing armory of 
prosecutorial discretion. These same channels could, in principle, be 
used to restrain our now admittedly excessive use, and must in the 
end be reformed if a permanent reduction in the scale of imprison-
ment is to be achieved. At present, however, the very extremity and 
power of the punitive complex we have constructed is actively nar-
rowing the capacity of these channels to allow change.30 
Despite crime rates that have largely remained at the low levels 
attained at the turn of the century and a growing tide of political 
support for ending mass incarceration, the national imprisonment 
rate and total number of prisoners in 2013 remained stubbornly close 
to its high in 2009.31 While there appears to be support for further 
reducing the imprisonment rate, there is no consensus about how far 
it should go.32 Already, shifts in prison sentencing patterns over the 
past decade have seen significant reduction in prisoners serving sen-
tences primarily based on a drug crime, and more than half of the 
current state prisoners are serving sentences for crimes considered 
                                                                                                             
 30 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 4, at 2. 
 31 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 1 
(2014) (At the end of 2013, the national prisoner population was up over 4,000 
prisoners from 2012, but at 1,574,700 remained below the peak of 1,615,500 pris-
oners in 2009.) 
 32 See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 4. 
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violent offenses.33 Some leaders have called for a fifty percent re-
duction in the national prison population, but this would still leave 
the United States with twice its historic incarceration rate and the 
highest in the wealthy democratic world.34 Even achieving that goal, 
however, would require steep reductions in the current length of sen-
tences for violent and serious property offenses,35 reductions for 
which there are, thus far, little evidence of public support or political 
leadership. 
A.   Court-Ordered Population Reductions 
Most of the decline in the United States prison population since 
2009 has come from reductions in a few states, particularly Califor-
nia, where in Brown v. Plata36 the Supreme Court upheld a massive 
federal court order population cap that forced the State to adopt laws 
diverting those convicted of most non-violent, non-sexual, non-se-
rious felony offenses to non-prison sentences—a process that has 
largely run its course.37 In fact, states as a whole added prisoners in 
2013, and the national decline that year was solely due to federal 
reductions.38  While Plata is a landmark ruling that suggests courts 
will no longer tolerate the toxic combination of overcrowding and 
chronic illness that is a structural feature of mass incarceration, the 
                                                                                                             
 33 Id. at 15–16 (54% of state prisoners were serving sentences for violent of-
fenses, but more than half of federal prisoners are serving drug sentences). 
 34 Former White House adviser and anti-incarceration activist Van Jones has 
called for a fifty percent reduction. Dana Goldstein, How to Cut the Prison Pop-
ulation by Fifty Percent, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/04/how-to-cut-the-prison-popula-
tion-by-50-percent. 
 35 John Pfaff, Opinion, For True Penal Reform, Focus on the Violent Offend-
ers, WASH. POST (July 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/for-
true-penal-reform-focus-on-the-violent-offenders/2015/07/26/1340ad4c-3208-
11e5-97ae-30a30cca95d7_story.html. 
 36 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 37 CARSON, supra note 31, at 12. 
 38 Id. at 13. Those diversion laws, known collectively as “correctional rea-
lignment,” had completed their population reduction with no further reductions 
expected due to those legal changes by the end of calendar year 2012. While law 
suits concerning overcrowding are pending throughout the nation and present an 
important pressure point for ending mass incarceration, the California experience 
suggests that years of litigation may have to take place before court orders re-
motely similar to Plata are likely. 
454 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:444 
 
nearly twenty years it took to produce a population cap, and the ex-
traordinary record produced in the case, suggests we need other de-
vices in play to dislodge mass incarceration in our lifetimes.39 
B.  Sentencing Reform 
For decades, sentencing reform has been the goal of those seek-
ing to end mass incarceration.40 In the strongest form of sentencing 
reform, states would agree on the size of the maximum prison pop-
ulations they wished to incarcerate, use statistical analysis of past 
sentencing patterns to predict the composition of future prison pop-
ulations, and reset sentences to achieve the new aggregate target. A 
commission could be charged with adjusting sentences as more data 
comes in to assure that the population remains in control. Thus far, 
however, progress toward sentencing reform has been modest and 
limited to specific legal reforms aimed at particularly indefensible 
and controversial examples of harsh and racially disproportionate 
justice, including New York’s Rockefeller-era drug trafficking sen-
tencing laws;41 California’s notoriously harsh and capricious “Three 
Strikes” felony sentence enhancement law;42 and Congress’ outra-
geously racially disproportionate minimum mandatory sentence for 
possessing more than 5 grams of “crack” cocaine (largely sold by 
and marketed to African Americans), or 500 grams of “powder” co-
caine (largely sold and marketed by whites).43 These one-off sen-
tencing reforms, even when made retroactive, have only had a mod-
est effect on the overall prison population. More ominously, given 
the massive armory of charging options state and federal prosecutors 
                                                                                                             
 39 SIMON, supra note 6, at 9–10. 
 40 See, e.g., Aviram, supra note 8, at 111. 
 41 Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal ‘70s Drug Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/nyregion/26rocke-
feller.html. 
 42 Since Three-Strikes was an amendment to the California Constitution by 
voter initiative, reforms have come through successful voter initiatives: Proposi-
tion 36 in 2010 and Proposition 47 in 2014. See, e.g., Paige St. John, Prop. 47 
Passes, Reducing Some Crime Penalties, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014, 9:01 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-ff-prop-47-drug-possession-
20141103-story.html. 
 43 Editorial Board, Sentencing Reform Starts to Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/opinion/sentencing-reform-starts-to-
pay-off.html. 
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now have available, there is nothing to prevent prosecutors’ intent 
on achieving long prison sentences from charging around these re-
forms. Although there is much discussion of broader sentencing re-
form at the federal level and from some governors, no significant 
piece of legislation has been put forward. Even the discussions sug-
gest that broader reforms are limited to drug and some low-level 
property crimes.44 
C.  Individualized Clemency, Parole, and Good Time Credits 
Executive and administrative actions, other than amnesty, also 
present a possible path toward reducing incarceration.45 In recent 
decades, presidents and governors have been famously reluctant to 
exercise their clemency or pardon powers, and rarely, if ever, have 
they used these tools to remove from prison those who are there un-
der legal and factually unchallenged convictions.46 The effort an-
nounced by President Obama and Attorney General Holder last year 
to use the clemency power to address the plight of federal prisoners 
serving long terms for non-violent drug offenses has just produced 
its first results—a batch of 46 prisoners, all of whom had served ten 
years or more, and most of whom faced life sentences.47 As was 
much reported, this was by far more than any President since 
Lyndon B. Johnson.48 The problem is that there are tens of thou-
sands of federal prisoners in prison for non-violent drug crimes.49 
                                                                                                             
 44 Francine Kiefer, Prison Sentencing Reform: Bipartisan Efforts Make 
Headway in Congress, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/0716/Prison-sentencing-refor-
Bipartisan-efforts-make-headway-in-Congress-video. 
 45 Larkin, supra note 25, at 2. 
 46 Id. at 3; Barkow, supra note 14, at 1333. 
 47 Hindin, supra note 26. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Hindin notes that there are nearly 100,000 prisoners serving drug sentences 
in federal prisons. Id. Presumably a smaller number meet President Obama’s cri-
teria of “non-violent.” A figure of 30 thousand was used in the New York Times 
editorial the day following President Obama’s visit to a federal prison in Okla-
homa to meet with some prisoners there for non-violent drug crimes. See Editorial 
Board, President Obama Takes on the Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/opinion/president-obama-takes-on-the-
prison-crisis.html. 
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Few, if any, governors have used clemency to reduce prison popu-
lations in their states.50 
Parole is an administrative process that allows a board of ex-
perts, usually appointed by the governor, to consider early release 
for inmates on an individualized basis, generally on a finding that 
they have been rehabilitated.51 Parole fell out of favor with politi-
cians and the public during the rise of mass incarceration and re-
mains as a general release mechanism for prisoners in only sixteen 
states.52 
Paul L. Larkin, Jr., has pointed to an expansion of “good time 
credits” for prisoners as a politically viable way to reduce prison 
overcrowding.53 Good time credits are another administrative meas-
ure, generally reducing a prisoner’s sentence by a legislated ratio of 
days off for a certain number of days of “good behavior.”54 As with 
parole, the mechanism must first be set up by the legislature, and 
any expansion in good time credits must also be approved by the 
legislature.55 Once in place, it is at the discretion of the warden to 
award the credits based on reports filed by prison staff on the in-
mates’ behavior.56 
A significant increase in good time credits could help reduce 
prison overcrowding and may be less controversial than reinstating 
parole or an amnesty, like the one proposed here. In designing a sus-
tainable system of prison sentences, good time credits have an im-
portant role to play. First, unless made retroactive and large, in 
which case they would be just as controversial as an amnesty, an 
increase in good time credits would take years to reduce prison over-
                                                                                                             
 50 There are a growing number of columns and editorials calling on governors 
to do just that. See, e.g., Michael Rinaldi, To Reform State Government, Gov. Wolf 
Should Reform the Pardons System, PENNLIVE (Jan. 26, 2015, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/2015/01/post_38.html (noting that recent gov-
ernors have rarely commuted the sentences of prisoners serving life sentences, 
where as governors in the 1970s did so frequently). 
 51 Larkin, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 52 Id. at 9–10. 
 53 Id. at 11. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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crowding and leave tens of thousands of prisoners experiencing de-
grading conditions during that period.57 Secondly, prisoners who ac-
cumulate disciplinary reports generally do not receive good time 
credits or can lose the ones they have.58 This means that prisoners 
who respond to degrading conditions by mentally decompensating, 
or developing a “bad attitude” toward staff, are at risk of not winning 
earlier release at all. In this latter respect, good time credits fit with 
the presumption of confidence in prosecutorial discretion, only with 
prison staff as prosecutors. Given the extremely hostile relationship 
between staff and prisoners developed under the regime of mass in-
carceration,59 staff might resist the population reduction effects of a 
good time credit extension law by writing up more prisoners for 
more trivial disciplinary violations. 
D.   Ideological Limits of Reform 
No doubt these pathways of reform, and others, such as decrim-
inalization through substantive criminal law reforms, are essential 
to ending mass incarceration and producing a sustainable and more 
legitimate criminal justice system. The problem is that they are cur-
rently constricted by powerful presumptions that favor suspicions of 
people convicted of even low-level crimes, and in turn, trust in law 
enforcement—especially prosecutors—to discern who the real 
threats are and how long they need to be incapacitated for.60 These 
presumptions operate much like an ideology in the sense that they 
are a structure of beliefs that operate below the level of conscious 
political or policy dialogue and help predetermine the limits of that 
dialogue.61 
                                                                                                             
 57 See id. at 41. 
 58 See id. at 11. 
 59 See, e.g., Aviram, supra note 8, at 108. 
 60 See SIMON, supra note 6, at 4. 
 61 Perhaps the most influential social theorist to develop ideology in this way 
was the mid-20th century Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. See ANTONIO 
GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 3 
(Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., trans., 11th prtg. 1992); see also 
LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards 
an Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 145 (Ben 
Brewster trans., 1971). 
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At the current conjuncture, one in which the window for policy 
change is open to an unusual degree, we can see a number of re-
strictions that have narrowed the possibility for more substantial 
change toward ending mass incarceration. Perhaps the most im-
portant is violence. Since fear of violence, euphemistically referred 
to as “public safety,” is and has been the underlying source of legit-
imacy for mass incarceration,62 politically realistic sentencing re-
form must first be predicated on separating those convicted of non-
violent crimes, whose status as exiled from the community through 
long-term incarceration is subject to possible review, and those con-
victed of violent crimes, whose status is not.63 Second, in order to 
protect public safety, even those convicted of non-violent crimes 
should be subject to individualized review, preferably dominated by 
prosecutors. To overcome these systemic restraints and open the 
pathways of reform to broad, generous, and urgent reform initia-
tives, we need legal mechanisms that will metaphorically disrupt, 
loosen, shake off, and ultimately reduce the hold of these presump-
tions.64 
E.   Dress Rehearsal for Amnesty 
We have already had one fascinating and successful experiment 
with such a legal “bomb.” In Brown v. Plata,65 the Supreme Court 
upheld the population cap imposed by a special three-judge federal 
court that was expected by both sides to result in tens of thousands 
                                                                                                             
 62 SIMON, supra note 6, 24–25 (describing fear of violence as crucial to the 
common sense that emerged in the 1970s and made mass incarceration a legiti-
mate response). 
 63 President Obama underscored this during his prison visit when he stated 
that his belief in giving prisoners a “second chance” did not extend to those con-
victed of violent crime. “‘There are people who need to be in prison, and I don’t 
have tolerance for violent criminals,’ Mr. Obama said. ‘Many of them may have 
made mistakes, but we need to keep our communities safe.’” See Peter Baker, 
Obama, In Oklahoma, Takes Reform Message to the Prison Cell Block, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/obama-el-reno-
oklahoma-prison.html. 
 64 Neither of which is sensible for public policy in the 2010s and beyond quite 
independently of this author’s undisguised zeal for the goal of ending mass incar-
ceration. 
 65 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
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of people being diverted from certain terms in California state pris-
ons, to very uncertain and mostly partial sentences in local county 
jails. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, described the underlying injunc-
tion as “the most radical” in U.S. history66 and Justice Alito, in his 
separate dissent, ominously predicted the murder of innocents 
would follow.67 The result, as of 2013, was the largest prison popu-
lation reduction in U.S. history and the most carefully monitored for 
signs of a crime wave.68 Despite media desire to report on such a 
crime wave, the only substantiated increase in crime was in auto-
thefts and burglaries.69 While plenty of police chiefs are ready to 
blame this on Realignment, there has been no public backlash thus 
far.70 Indeed, when the voters approved Proposition 47, they did so 
knowing that it would put some 2,000 additional prisoners back in 
the community.71 Together, these initiatives have allowed the state 
to meet its overcrowding target set by the Plata Court72 and, re-
cently, to be given limited authority to run its own prison medical 
system at enormous cost savings to what it would have taken to build 
more prisons in order to meet the crisis. 
Not only has Plata and Realignment not led to a crime wave or 
a backlash, it has also unleashed a revolution in criminal justice pol-
icymaking, where decisions, which were once made by politically 
competitive legislators and all powerful local prosecutors, are now 
                                                                                                             
 66 Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 1968 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 68 Christopher Horne & William J. Newman, Updates Since Brown v. Plata: 
Alternative Solutions for Prison Overcrowding in California, 43 J. ACAD. OF 
PSYCHIATRY & L. ONLINE 87, 88 (2015); Giana Magnoli, Police Chief Says Rea-
lignment to Blame for Rise in Santa Barbara Crime, NOOZHAWK (Jan. 9, 2013, 
1:38 AM), http://www.noozhawk.com/article/010813_police_chief_realign-
ment_rise_in_crime/. 
 69 Magnus Lofstrom & Stephen Raphael, Public Safety Realignment and 
Crime Rates in California, PUB. POLICY INST. CAL., 1–2 (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1213MLR.pdf (violent crime rose 
slightly as well, but comparisons with other states suggests this was part of a 
broader trend not related to prison releases in California). 
 70 Magnoli, supra note 68. 
 71 See Editorials, California’s Prison-Population Reduction is Good News, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/opin-
ion/editorials/article/California-s-prison-population-reduction-is-6052893.php. 
 72 Id. 
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subject to a Community Correctional Council at which a wide vari-
ety of criminal justice policy makers have a seat.73 While these 
councils are far from fully representative, they appear to be far more 
open to the voices of communities that experience high levels of in-
carceration and crime than either legislatures or prosecutors.74 
As noted above, future Brown v. Plata-like decisions are possi-
ble if states do not take their own steps to reduce overcrowding, but 
they will take years and they largely leave it to the states to decide 
how to respond. With state budgets recovering from the Great Re-
cession, there is little guarantee that other states with chronic over-
crowding will respond as California did in the midst of its deepest 
fiscal crisis in decades.75 Instead, this article offers legal amnesty as 
an alternative or supplement in the form of general measures of sen-
tence relief, whether legislative or executive, that produce Plata-like 
drops in state prison populations.76 Amnesties of one-time sentence 
reductions aimed at reducing chronic overcrowding in a short, but 
orderly manner, will not substitute for the hard political work of en-
acting substantial sentencing reform and transforming law enforce-
ment and prosecutorial routines. However, they could dramatically 
change the context in which that reform will take place, freeing 
those states to reinvent their model of criminal justice and saving 
both money and prisoner lives that would be lost to costly and inad-
equate medical care in prison settings. 
II. JUBILEE: TEMPORALITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND RESTORATION 
And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim 
liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants 
thereof: it shall be a jubile[e] unto you; and ye shall 
return every man unto his possession, and ye shall 
return every man unto his family. 
                                                                                                             
 73 Kathryn Jett & Joan Hancock, Realignment in the Counties, 25 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 236, 238 (2013). 
 74 Id. 
 75 AVIRAM, supra note 8, at 6; GOTTSCHALK, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
 76 An enlightened legislature and or governor could meet a Plata-like legal 
challenge by raising overcrowding and medical care with an amnesty law de-
signed to obviate the need for a judicial population cap. 
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 Leviticus 25:10 
The long legal tradition of amnesties takes its precedence from 
the religious tradition beginning in the Biblical requirement of a “ju-
bilee,” or periodic forgiveness of all sorts of bonds (including penal 
ones). The structure of the Biblical injunction brings into play three 
crucial elements that have informed amnesty as a practice ever 
since. The first is time: fifty years. Amnesties are regular, but ex-
traordinary. One might see only one in a lifetime, or live one’s whole 
life without seeing one. The second is sovereignty. Not only is the 
passage a command for God, it is a directive to those who hold 
power over others. Finally, it commands an act of restoration, which 
returns people to their possessions and their families, not on the ba-
sis of individual desert, but universally. Like much in the Bible, the 
account of the Jubilee is fragmentary and incomplete. What happens 
after the fiftieth year? Is it an end to servitudes, punishments, and 
debts, or only a furlough? Despite this, the idea and structure of a 
jubilee has remained a persistent one in the western political and 
religious tradition. Heads of church and state have regularly marked 
their reigns with amnesties pardoning sins, and in the case of mon-
arch’s, actual crimes. There is something that works about this triad 
of marking time, conditioning the power of sovereigns, and building 
restoration into systems of otherwise unending oppression. 
A.   The Ecclesiastical Tradition of Jubilee 
Jubilees have been declared by heads of the Roman Catholic 
Church since Pope Boniface reestablished the practice in 1300.77 
The declaration or Bull issued by Boniface offered a forgiveness of 
sins to those who visited the main Roman Basilicas during the com-
ing year in honor of the closing of the century and the beginning of 
a new one.78 According to religion scholar Jose Casanova, this was 
the first time a Christian “century” was acknowledged as an im-
portant unit of time.79 By 1500, the practice was well established, 
                                                                                                             
 77 Jose Casanova, Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization, 62 SOC. 
RELIGION 415, 420 n.4 (2001). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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typically occurring every 25 years, and survived even Luther’s at-
tack on the larger structure of “indulgences” or church forgiveness 
of sins.80 
In 2000, this tradition was revitalized by Pope John Paul II to 
mark the millennial year.81 The Pope chose to focus much of his 
public declaration of the jubilee on the plight of prisoners, calling 
on world leaders to honor the millennium by undertaking a mass 
release of prisoners; a call he repeated in his 2002 address to the 
Italian parliament.82 In a dramatic visit to one of Rome’s over-
crowded prisons, the Pope represented the potential benefits of a 
mass asylum as going beyond simply relieving the immediate suf-
fering of overcrowding to shaping the proper context for undertak-
ing the kind of reform of criminal justice necessary to prevent future 
overcrowding: 
Jubilees have been an incentive for the community to 
reconsider human justice against the measure of 
God’s justice. Only a calm appraisal of the function-
ing of penal institutions, a candid recognition of the 
goals society has in mind in confronting crime, and a 
serious assessment of the means adopted to attain 
these goals have led in the past and can still lead to 
identifying the corrections which need to be made.83 
While the papal tradition of jubilees may indeed seem a distant 
precedent for the context of modern legal amnesties, it is remarkable 
and relevant to our discussion that Pope John Paul II chose to focus 
his revitalization of this tradition on the most secular and legal sub-
ject of prisoners. Moreover, the Pope personally went to an over-
crowded prison to bear witness to the conditions there, to personally 
embody a refusal to treat prisoners as belonging to a world apart, 
and to call on secular leaders to use their legal authority to relieve 
                                                                                                             
 80 Id. at 421 n.4. 
 81 Id. at 421. 
 82 Cheryl Heckler, Italy Moves to Relieve Overcrowding in its Jail Cells, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 18, 2003), http://www.csmoni-
tor.com/2003/0718/p07s02-woeu.html. 
 83 Pope John Paul II, The Celebration of the Great Jubilee: Message for the 
Jubilee in Prisons, L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO WKLY. EDITION ENG. (July 5, 
2000), https://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/jjp2pris.htm. 
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the prisoners’ suffering through a mass amnesty.84 This combination 
of personal action to close the gap between prisons and society, to 
witness the reality of overcrowded prisons, and to call for mass 
measures of amnesty, provides a striking precedent with great rele-
vance to secular leaders.85 
Speaking at the prison, Pope John Paul II made specific refer-
ence to the relationship between time, sovereignty, and restoration 
embedded in the original biblical injunction: 
The Jubilee reminds us that time belongs to God. 
Even time in prison does not escape God’s dominion. 
Public authorities who deprive human beings of their 
personal freedom as the law requires, bracketing off 
as it were a longer or shorter part of their life, must 
realize that they are not masters of the prisoners’ 
time. In the same way, those who are in detention 
must not live as if their time in prison had been taken 
from them completely: even time in prison is God’s 
time. As such it needs to be lived to the full; it is a 
time which needs to be offered to God as a[n] occa-
sion of truth, humility, expiation and even faith. The 
Jubilee serves to remind us that not only does time 
belong to God, but that the moments in which we 
succeed in “restoring” all things in Christ become for 
us “a time of the Lord’s favour”.86 
Pope John Paul’s call was eventually taken up by the Italian Par-
liament, which, in 2006, enacted a general pardon law that elimi-
nated prison overcrowding (although sadly only temporarily).87 
                                                                                                             
 84 Heckler, supra note 82. 
 85 It is perhaps not insignificant in this respect that President Obama recently 
visited a federal prison in Oklahoma, becoming the first sitting president to do so 
ever. While there, he pointedly commented on the fact that the 90 square foot cells 
had been fitted to hold three prisoners, a mark of chronic overcrowding in the 
federal system. While calling for new efforts at rehabilitation, reentry, and sen-
tencing reform, the President stopped short of issuing his own amnesty call. See 
Baker, supra note 63. 
 86 Pope John Paul II, supra note 83. 
 87 Buonanno & Raphael, infra note 116, at 2441. 
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Pope Benedict88 continued John Paul II’s campaign to improve 
prison conditions. Perhaps even more interestingly, Pope Francis re-
cently declared an “Extraordinary Jubilee Year” (i.e., one not fol-
lowing the traditional spans of 25), “a Holy Year of Mercy” which 
began December 8, 2015 and runs through November 20, 2016.89 
While Pope Francis did not mention prison overcrowding specifi-
cally in his message, he made it a point to visit a prison very early 
in his papacy; one on his own home continent of South America and 
known by inmates for wretched conditions and control.90 
B.   The Monarchical Tradition of Amnesty 
The Roman Church was a model for the states that eventually 
evolved out of medieval European society, so it is perhaps not sur-
prising that amnesties became a regular ritual of European monar-
chy.91 New monarchs commonly marked their ascension to the 
throne by opening the prisons of the nation.92 To modern citizens, 
this practice likely seems perverse in every sense. How can a new 
leader promote the peace of the realm and the success of his or her 
reign by suspending the punishments imposed under the legal sys-
tem of his or her predecessor who was commonly also his or her 
parent or close relative?93 In the distinctive political logic of monar-
chy, with its roots in religious conceptions of the sovereign as the 
national “pope,” or representative of the people to God, the begin-
                                                                                                             
 88 Philip Pullella, Pope Visits Rome Jail, Decries Overcrowding, REUTERS 
(Dec. 18, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18/us-pope-
prison-idUSTRE7BH0IS20111218 (Sadly, Italy had already cleared its over-
crowding with the 2006 Amnesty and then built it up again). 
 89 Ed West, Pope Francis Announces Extraordinary Jubilee Year, CATHOLIC 
HERALD (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.catholicher-
ald.co.uk/news/2015/03/13/pope-announces-extraordinary-jubilee-year/. 
 90 The Pope Visits Bolivia’s Notorious Palmasola Prison, NPR (July 11, 
2015, 5:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/11/422114674/the-pope-visits-bo-
livia-s-notorious-palmasola-prison. 
 91 See, e.g., John C. Palenberg, Mass Amnesty: The East German Answer to 
Prison Overcrowding, 11 AM. J. CRIM L. 369, 370 (1983). 
 92 See, e.g., id. 
 93 Of course, where a monarch has reached the throne after emptying it of a 
rival claimant, it may well be his or her own supporters who make up the great 
proportion of the prison population, and thus releasing them would make great 
sense. 
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ning of a new reign was a jubilee, a holy year which, like the Chris-
tian centuries, marked a divine presence in human life.94 An amnesty 
of prisoners in honor of this jubilee portended not a crime wave, but 
a world made over in justice and therefore potentially crime free.95 
Alongside this theological and political logic, the more individ-
ual level politics of prisoner release may have also been in play. To-
day, asylum for prisoners is seen as a politically risky move for 
elected politicians.96 Then, asylum would have been a populist ges-
ture. In that world, without hyperventilating media coverage of 
crime (or anything else) and political valorization of crime victims, 
there were probably far more people positively touched by the sud-
den release of a son, brother, husband, or father, than there were 
aggrieved. 
C.   Asylum in Modern European Governments 
One might have expected amnesties to die away with the emer-
gence of modern regimes of government because of their legal, as 
opposed to traditional or charismatic, claims to legitimacy. Indeed, 
one might expect governments dependent on the force of the law to 
maintain the legitimacy of their rule to avoid gestures that seem to 
inherently question the obligatory nature of law. Yet in Europe, the 
practice continued with hardly any interruption. 
1.   GERMANY 
Germany is a striking example. The Hohenzollern imperial re-
gime that collapsed in 1918 had frequently declared amnesties for 
prisoners to mark royal ascensions and weddings,97 but the Weimar 
republic that replaced it began a series of prisoner amnesties, origi-
nally premised on the need for labor after the terrible losses of man-
power in the war.98 However, as Weimar’s increasingly violent 
street politics filled the prisons with partisans of the left and right, 
amnesties took on an increasingly political character.99 
                                                                                                             
 94 See Pope John Paul II, supra note 83. 
 95 Id.; see also, e.g., Palenberg, supra note 91, at 370. 
 96 See generally Simon, supra note 15. 
 97 See Palenberg, supra note 91. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. at 371. 
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After World War II, both sides of the divided nation continued 
the practice.100 First, in 1945, the Soviets who had occupied the east-
ern part of Germany, declared an amnesty for all crimes adjudicated 
by the Nazi state.101 The motive was both the need for able-bodied 
adults to labor in the devastated nation and the questionable nature 
of “crimes” defined and enforced by a regime now notorious for its 
crimes against humanity.102 In 1949, the West German government, 
under its first premier Konrad Adenauer, declared an amnesty aimed 
at the need for labor, and initially focused only on those convicted 
of crimes by the Nazi state.103 Soon, however, under pressure from 
the political right, Adenauer extended the amnesty to include former 
Nazis themselves. 
The East German approach to amnesty was even more pro-
tracted.104 In 1950, the Soviets who still directly ruled the occupied 
East Germany closed their prison camps and released about 15,000 
prisoners.105 In 1951, the new East German government declared its 
own amnesty for about 20,000 prisoners.106 This was repeated again 
in 1956, resulting in another 18,000 releases.107 The most dramatic 
amnesty of all was in 1979, when the East German government, fac-
ing increasingly political and economic challenges, released 32,000 
prisoners—over 70 percent of its prison population—in less than 
one month.108 
2.   ITALY 
Italy has a similar history to Germany with respect to amnesties 
and pardons. Between the unification of Italy in 1865 and the defeat 
of Fascist Italy in 1943, Italian governments issued some 200 am-
nesties; some quite general, others aimed at very specific crimes or 
                                                                                                             
 100 See id. at 371–72. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See id. at 371. 
 103 See Belinda Cooper, Truth and Reconciliation, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 9, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/09/books/truth-and-reconciliation.html. 
 104 See Palenberg, supra note 91, at 371. 
 105 Id. at 372. 
 106 Id. at 373. 
 107 Id. at 374. 
 108 Id. at 376–77. 
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groups of convicts.109 The occasions for these pardons ranged from 
royal births and weddings to territorial conquests and peace trea-
ties.110 The frequent use of pardons has continued in post-World 
War II Italy, with a dozen amnesties or general pardons since 
1945.111 Indeed, so normal is the act of amnesty that Article 79 of 
the 1945 Constitution is devoted to it.112 The objective of these mod-
ern Italian pardons has shifted from a focus on reunifying the nation 
after a divisive and disastrous war to the contemporary concern with 
prison overcrowding.113 The first pardon to deal with overcrowding 
came in 1986, when rising crime rates in the early 1980s and a stable 
level of prison capacity led to the country’s first modern experience 
with prison overcrowding.114 Sixteen years passed before the next 
general pardon in 2006; this one again focused on prison overcrowd-
ing.115 
The 2006 pardon was the largest one ever, and came in response 
to Pope John Paul II’s millennial call for amnesties to address prison 
overcrowding.116 Italian prisons at the time were operating at 130 
percent of capacity, resulting in a drop of nearly 30 percent of the 
prison population in less than six months.117 Under the terms of the 
pardon, all persons convicted before May 2, 2006 had their sentence 
reduced by three years.118 Those convicted of a new crime with a 
                                                                                                             
 109 Alessandro Barbarino & Giovanni Mastrobuoni, The Incapacitation Effect 
of Incarceration: Evidence from Several Italian Collective Pardons, IZA 3, 8 
(Feb. 2012), http://ftp.iza.org/dp6360.pdf. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 9. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. In Italy, amnesties are distinguished from pardons on the basis that the 
former completely eliminates the crime and the sentence, while the latter elimi-
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 114 Id. at 10. 
 115 Id. (Inbetween, Italy had amended its Constitution to require a higher super 
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 116 Paolo Buonanno & Steven Raphael, Incarceration and Incapacitation: Ev-
idence from the 2006 Italian Collective Pardon, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2437, 2441 
(2013). 
 117 Id. at 2441–42. 
 118 Id. at 2441. The pardon excluded those convicted of organized crime, fel-
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sentence of at least two years faced a sentence enhancement of any 
months reprieved during the pardon.119 Released prisoners received 
no services or supervision.120 
Crime effects have been the primary concern of the economists 
who have studied the Italian pardons.121 In fact, crime increased sig-
nificantly in the years immediately following the pardon, although 
these were mostly property crimes.122 Moreover, while Italian par-
dons worked some very rapid reductions in prison overcrowding (up 
to 70 percent in some regions), the prison population has rebounded 
quickly, growing an average of 2,944 inmates in the year following 
a pardon, compared with 1,165 inmates.123 To address long-term 
overcrowding, economists recommend building more prisons or in-
creasing alternatives to incarceration rather than relying on par-
dons.124 
This modern European history seems to stand as a warning 
against reliance on amnesties to address problems of either demog-
raphy or regime change. Once begun, amnesties seem to spread 
quickly beyond their initial targets and motives, and often incorpo-
rate those, like former Nazis, who clearly do not deserve them. In a 
situation like that of East Germany’s, where amnesties are repeated 
within the same generation, it is reasonable to expect that the deter-
rence power of the criminal law, always questionable, will falter fur-
ther as people anticipate that potential convictions will be wiped 
away in the next amnesty. More insidiously, such amnesties raise 
questions about whether these modern governments are truly based 
on the rule of law, as they claim, or only on political calculation. 
                                                                                                             
 119 Id.; Francesco Drago et al., The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from 
a Natural Experiment, 117 J. POL. ECON. 257, 258 (2009) (finding an increase in 
deterrence with the increasing number of months pardoned prisoner faced as ad-
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 120 Buonanno & Raphael, supra note 116, at 2441. 
 121 See Barbarino & Mastrobuoni, supra note 109, at 3. 
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costs). 
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3.   THE UNITED STATES 
The United States Constitution grants the President the “Power 
to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United 
States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”125 Courts have recognized 
few, if any, limitations on this power.126 This power has many di-
mensions, including reprieves, or temporary delays of sentence, par-
dons, which are a complete removal of all legal aspects of a convic-
tion (including punishment, but also the very fact of guilt), and com-
mutations, which are reductions in the scope or severity of a sen-
tence.127 The pardon power also incorporates the idea of amnesty, 
which is for all essential purposes a grant of pardon or clemency to 
“a class of offenders instead of individually.”128 While pardons have 
been common across American history until the last forty years, am-
nesties have always been special, usually coming only after a war.129 
While the President is granted independent authority to grant 
pardons and amnesties, Congress also has at times acted to facilitate 
the use of that power.130 At the outbreak of the civil war, Congress 
enacted the Confiscation Act of 1862, stating that: 
the President is hereby authorized, at anytime here-
after, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may 
have participated in the existing rebellion in any 
State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such 
exceptions and at such time and on such conditions 
as he may deem expedient for the public welfare.131 
                                                                                                             
 125 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Barkow, supra note 10, at 8. 
 126 Barkow, supra note 10, at 10–11. 
 127 Id. at 9. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See, e.g., id. at 12. 
 131 Confiscation Act, ch. 195, 2 Stat. 589, 592 (1862); Daniel W. Hamilton, 
First and Second Confiscation Acts (1861, 1862), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2004), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3407400130.html (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015). 
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President Lincoln followed that course a year later, offering an 
amnesty to all members of the rebellion who had not held Confed-
erate office or mistreated Union prisoners.132 Interestingly, Presi-
dent Lincoln also issued a very different kind of mass pardon or am-
nesty in 1862 when he reprieved 254 of 303 Native Americans sen-
tenced to death for an uprising in Nebraska.133 After the war, Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson offered the defeated confederates even more 
generous amnesty terms.134 President Truman issued four different 
amnesty measures addressing military or selective service offenses 
after World War II.135 Additionally, Presidents Ford and Carter is-
sued successfully broader amnesties for Vietnam-era offenses.136 
There is far less evidence of past use of mass amnesty in the 
United States outside of the context of war and military-related of-
fenses. What action there was in mass pardons or amnesties took 
place at the state level, where until the late 20th century, the vast 
majority of all criminal prosecutions and imprisonment occurred.137 
Unlike the Constitution, which gives exclusive authority over par-
doning to the President, some two thirds of the states give an admin-
istrative board authority to either make recommendations on par-
dons, or share the actual power to pardon with the governor.138 In-
dividual pardons were extremely common at the state level until the 
late 20th century, but mass pardons or amnesties have been rare. 
One important precedent took place in 1823, when New York 
Governor Robert Yates pardoned scores of surviving prisoners after 
many others succumbed to insanity from being held in complete sol-
itary confinement without the opportunity for labor during a several 
year-long experiment with different forms of solitary confinement 
                                                                                                             
 132 JONATHAN TRUMAN DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN 
AND JOHNSON: THE RESTORATION OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR RIGHTS AND 
PRIVILEGES, 1861-1898, at 35 (1953); Larkin, supra note 25, at 7. 
 133 JOHN J. MONTAG, RONALD C. NAUGLE & JAMES C. OLSON, HISTORY OF 
NEBRASKA 183 (4th ed. 2015). 
 134 Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1174 n.16 (2010). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See infra notes 139, 140. 
 138 Barkow, supra note 14, at 1350. 
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at Auburn prison.139 In 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan issued 
a mass clemency to all of the prisoners on Illinois’ death row, some 
167 prisoners, reducing their sentences from death to life imprison-
ment.140 The Governor acted after conducting clemency hearings 
and following repeated scandals involving government misconduct 
leading to the wrongful conviction of prisoners sentenced to 
death.141 
4.   AMNESTY UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
One of the most common but fraught situations in which con-
temporary governments consider granting broad amnesties is in sit-
uations of “transitional justice” where a new political order is being 
constituted after the collapse of a previous regime (such as a military 
dictatorship) or following a protracted militarized conflict, or 
both.142 International human rights law is particularly concerned 
with the extension of amnesties to members of the armed forces or 
of insurgent militias who have committed human rights violations 
against others.143 Yet even in this distinct situation, amnesty is dis-
favored but not forbidden.144 The United Nations does not endorse 
or support tribunals that grant amnesties dealing with “genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of human 
rights.”145 Amnesties in transitional justice situations, even when 
they exclude these major crimes, are considered highly problematic 
because they leave victims of human rights violations without jus-
tice and can lead to further conflict. Amnesties should be considered 
                                                                                                             
 139 REBECCA MCCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, 
POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-1941, at 57 
(2008). 
 140 Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Clears out Death Row 
in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/us/
citing-issue-of-fairness-governor-clears-out-death-row-in-illinois.html. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in 
Transitional Justice Schemes, 50 VA. J. INTL. L. 915, 916 (2009). 
 143 Id. at 917–18. 
 144 See id. 
 145 U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, 
4 (Mar. 2010). 
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only when absolutely necessary to secure an agreement for demobi-
lization, disarmament, and reintegration of conflict participants.146 
States in transitional justice contexts that do engage in amnesty are 
urged to do so in ways that retain as much accountability as possi-
ble.147 
III. AN AMNESTY APPROACH TO ENDING MASS INCARCERATION 
This article has the limited ambition of putting amnesty into the 
conversation about how to end mass incarceration in the United 
States. Given the present state of the conversation, there will be 
plenty of time to lay out the details of federal and state amnesty 
measures, but this argument would be incomplete without a sketch 
of the basic features of the amnesty model I would advocate. One 
huge issue is scale. There is no current consensus on how low the 
incarceration rate in America should drop, or how much overcrowd-
ing is tolerable in a prison setting. If mass incarceration refers in part 
to the supersizing of the historically relatively consistent American 
incarceration rate of 100 per 100 thousand, then “ending mass incar-
ceration” requires a radical reduction in our current level of around 
400 per 100 thousand, to something less than half of the current 
rate.148 Indeed, given that crime rates are now as low as they were 
in the early 1960s,149 a case can be made for returning incarceration 
rates to the pre-1975 norm of 100 prisoners per 100 thousand people. 
It is not my claim, however, that amnesty laws should be the 
primary engine of restoring balance to American incarceration, lest 
we end up like modern Italy or Germany with some half-dozen am-
nesties each in sixty years. That must be accomplished by sentenc-
ing reforms. The appropriate goal of amnesties instead should be to 
wipe out overcrowding and to undermine the structural power of the 
twin presumptions of the dangerousness of people convicted of 
crimes and confidence in prosecutorial discretion. 
                                                                                                             
 146 Mark Freeman, Amnesties and DDR Programs, INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUST., Feb. 2010 at 2. 
 147 See id. at 3. 
 148 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 1, at 13. 
 149 Zimring, supra note 2, at 1240–41. 
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I propose that the federal government and each state with prison 
populations above 100 percent of their design capacity should intro-
duce a general amnesty applicable to all prison sentences by be-
tween 12 and 36 months, depending on the severity of overcrowd-
ing. This would mean that, as was the case in the Italian general 
amnesty law of 2006,150 those currently serving sentences of less 
than the designated amnesty term of between 12 and 36 months 
would be released immediately. Others would be released as their 
remaining sentence term dipped beneath that amnesty term. As in 
the Italian case, the portion of the amnesty term actually used would 
be held over the beneficiary as a sentencing enhancement to any new 
term of at least one year of imprisonment.151 
A.   Why Mass Incarceration Warrants an Amnesty Response 
As noted above, the United States has no tradition of using am-
nesties to manage its prison population (unlike Europe). Instead, 
amnesties have been limited in the United States to extreme aberra-
tions of penal norms (like the Auburn, New York solitary confine-
ment scheme) and to wartime expansions of criminal liability.152 
                                                                                                             
 150 The Italian law excluded mafia crimes because of the deep and continuing 
threat of mafia corruption of Italian government. See Alessandro Barbarino & 
Giovanni Mastrobuoni, The Incapacitation Effect of Incarceration: Evidence 
from Several Italian Collective Pardons, 6 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POLICY 1, 9 
(2014). There is no equivalent class of criminals that pose a serious threat to the 
integrity of American government today. America’s own mafia is a pale shadow 
of what it was in the 1950s and was never the force it was in Italy. Politicians will 
no doubt want to limit the amnesty to “non-violent offenses.” This would fatally 
limit the ability of amnesty laws to reduce incarceration substantially and it turns 
on a distinction that has little empirical basis or practical sense (despite having 
great common sense appeal). Since the inflation of prison sentences has taken 
place across the entire spectrum of crimes including drug, property, and crimes 
against the person, an amnesty offering relief should apply to all crimes. As with 
the Italian law, however, the amnesty should be limited to crimes committed at 
least three months before the commencement of the consideration of the law (to 
avoid a crime incentive during its debate) and for which at least six months of the 
sentence have been served (to avoid reducing the effective punishment for their 
crimes to zero). 
 151 Thus, those who had less than 12 to 35 months left to serve when the am-
nesty law took effect would face fewer months of enhancements. 
 152 See infra Part II.C.3. 
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While not perfect, the situation of mass incarceration fits with this 
limited role and justifies a unique departure from it. 
1.   MASS INCARCERATION IS AN ABERRATION OF AMERICAN PENAL 
NORMS 
The very concept of mass incarceration, although not without 
controversy, arose from the recognition by scholars of punishment 
and society that U.S. imprisonment trends since the late 1970s had 
departed from historic norms.153 This is true not only of the scale of 
imprisonment,154 but even more importantly the allocation and prac-
tice of imprisonment. Historically, imprisonment in the United 
States was based on individualized consideration.155 With the ex-
ception of the most serious felonies, few crimes attracted mandatory 
prison sentences.156 The era of mass incarceration changed dramat-
ically with the practice of routine imprisonment for minor felonies 
and parole violations and the adoption of mandatory sentencing 
schemes that required imposition of prolonged prison sentences, 
notwithstanding mitigating factual circumstances.157 These sentenc-
ing laws and practices have in turn given prosecutors, who hold vir-
tually unreviewable discretion to determine which specific charges 
                                                                                                             
 153 See generally MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
(David Garland ed., 2001). 
 154 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF 
IMPRISONMENT xi (1991). 
 155 See CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 1, at 72 (“Because sentenc-
ing was to be individualized and judges had wide discretion, there were no stand-
ards for appellate judges to use in assessing a challenged sentence.”). 
 156 See id. at 72–73 (“For the prison-bound, judges set maximum (and some-
times minimum) sentences, and parole boards decided whom to release and 
when . . . The second phase, from the mid-1980s through 1996, aimed primarily 
to make sentences for drug and violent crimes harsher and their imposition more 
certain. The principal mechanisms to those ends were mandatory minimum sen-
tence, three strikes, truth-in-sentencing, and life without possibility of parole laws. 
Mandatory minimum sentence laws required minimum prison terms for people 
convicted of particular crimes.”) 
 157 Perhaps the most infamous is the five-year minimum mandatory sentence 
for possession of five grams or more of “crack cocaine” under the federal law. 
That was reduced somewhat by Congress in 2010. See ALEXANDER, supra note 
5, at 87; Editorial, For True Penal Reform, Focus on the Violent Offenders, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2010/08/02/AR2010080204360.html. 
2016] AMNESTY NOW! ENDING PRISON OVERCROWDING THROUGH A 
CATEGORICAL USE OF THE PARDON POWER 475 
 
to bring against a criminal defendant in the U.S., unprecedented 
power undermining the right to trial and the adversary system gen-
erally.158 
Mass incarceration has been responsible for an unprecedented 
concentration of imprisonment on minorities, particularly African 
Americans and Latinos.159 With more African American men fated 
to spend time in prison than receiving higher education or joining 
the military, incarceration has become a normative experience in 
many communities leading to a spiral of social disorganization, con-
centrated poverty, and crime.160 Disenfranchisement and other disa-
bilities associated with having served a prison sentence in many 
states has undermined the meaning of citizenship and reversed the 
gains of the civil rights movement during the 20th century.161 
Mass incarceration has led to chronic overcrowding across the 
nation, resulting in a historic devolution of standards of decency in 
American corrections.162 Prolonged exposure to cruel and degrading 
treatment, combined with an expanded prison population that in-
cludes a high proportion of people with chronic illnesses, constitutes 
“torture on the installment plan” for thousands of prisoners, in vio-
lation of the core commitments of the Eighth Amendment.163 Of 
course, prisons in the United States have almost always lagged be-
hind their progressive promises,164 sometimes by overwhelming 
margins, but mass incarceration differs in reflecting a conscious 
state policy to expand the destructiveness of incarceration and to de-
liberately inflict it on members of historically stigmatized and dis-
criminated-against social groups.165 
It is not that history lacks analogs for the systemic inhumanity 
and racialized violence of mass incarceration. The convict lease sys-
tem, which essentially enslaved African Americans convicted of mi-
nor felonies in a patently unfair judicial process and operated from 
                                                                                                             
 158 Stuntz, supra note 10, at 107. 
 159 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 1, at 13. 
 160 TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
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the Reconstruction period (1870s) through the turn of the century, 
involved many of the same evils.166 But even if mass incarceration 
lies a good deal closer to the norms of a legitimate and constitutional 
correctional system than the convict lease system, it still lies clearly 
on the side of the aberrational and is in need of systematic and deep 
remedies, including amnesty. A closer analogy than the convict 
lease system may be New York’s use of solitary confinement with-
out labor or education at the dawn of the penitentiary era in the 
1820s.167 As noted above, after the practice was denounced as 
deeply injurious to prisoners, Governor Yates pardoned the surviv-
ing prisoners.168 
2.   DEFORMATION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION 
The U.S. criminal justice system places extraordinary discretion 
in the hands of prosecutors.169 They are not obliged, as under some 
legal systems, to charge all crimes for which the evidence meets the 
legal definitions, which would allow courts to exercise the discre-
tion.170 Instead, at the state level, prosecutors have nearly unreview-
able discretion to decide which charges to bring against which de-
fendants.171 At the federal level, the Attorney General has formal 
authority and, since the 1970s, many Attorney Generals have issued 
directives guiding that give discretion to United States Attorneys, 
who are appointed by the President to prosecute crimes on behalf of 
the United States in each of the federal judicial districts.172 In the 
past, various political and professional forces operated to prevent 
prosecutorial discretion from becoming a dangerous power to op-
press or persecute.173 But the political and legal transformations that 
created mass incarceration insulated the prosecution from those 
                                                                                                             
 166 ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH xiv–xv (1996). 
 167 See supra Part II.C.3. 
 168 Id.; MCCLENNAN, supra note 139, at 57. 
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sources of restraint, and indeed greatly expanded the range of puni-
tive severity available for prosecutors.174 One of the leading scholars 
of modern American criminal justice, the late William Stuntz, 
showed how a politically reinforcing cycle of legislators enacting 
harsher laws, combined with prosecutors using that expanded power 
to erode judicial restraints, has produced nothing short of a “col-
lapse” of the American system of criminal justice.175 
3.   WAR ON CRIME 
The strongest pattern in the American use of amnesty has been 
its association with wartime criminal offenses. After virtually every 
major war, there have been appeals for amnesties for citizens who 
committed criminal offenses against the military effort—typically 
draft resisters and deserters.176 The most recent and famous followed 
the Vietnam War, America’s longest war until Afghanistan and one 
that generated unusual political controversy domestically.177 The 
“war on crime” announced by American presidents of both parties 
in the 1960s and reaffirmed repeatedly by presidents until perhaps 
President Obama, while different in many respects from our military 
conflicts abroad, operated in many ways like a real war: mobilizing 
enormous governmental outlays, massively expanding the scale and 
lethal capacity of law enforcement, and concentrating that coercive 
power on territories within our urban cores, marked by race, lan-
guage, and the perception (especially on the part of law enforce-
ment) of dangerousness.178 This war, our longest by far, severely 
compromised the legitimacy and self-repairing capacity of our crim-
inal justice system.179 
The analogy with respect to amnesty is, in fact, imperfect in 
many respects. Peacetime amnesties are made to prisoners or pro-
spective prisoners who would have committed no crime at all but 
                                                                                                             
 174 See id. at 36. 
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for the previous state of war, which exposed them to legal obliga-
tions that do not normally apply in civil society.180 Many of the ben-
eficiaries of these amnesties did, in fact, serve the war cause to some 
extent before they deviated from their duties, and thus may well be 
seen as deserving of some gratitude expressed as mercy.181 Perhaps 
most importantly, few beneficiaries of peacetime military offense 
amnesties were likely to be seen as a threat to the public safety of 
the communities to which they returned.182 In contrast, prisoners are 
much more likely to be viewed as undeserving of mercy and a threat 
to public safety.183 
But precisely because mass incarceration represents such a de-
parture from American legal and correctional practice, the analogy 
turns out to be less imperfect, and more meaningful, than might first 
appear. The enormous expansion of imprisonment means that many 
people now serving sentences would not have gone to prison at all, 
or would have already been released by now under shorter sen-
tences. Their offenses may have pre-existed the war on crime, but 
not the stigma enhancing the fact of imprisonment. 
For the same reason, the beneficiaries of a new amnesty aimed 
at ending prison overcrowding may carry less burden of public re-
tributive emotions than would be the case of an amnesty in more 
normal correctional times. Indeed, while not subjects deserving of 
gratitude, prisoners in the era of chronic overcrowding may be per-
ceived as deserving mercy precisely because the system failed to 
protect them from cruel and degrading treatment, or even torture. 
Finally, while there is little doubt that an actual amnesty law would 
be greeted with much concern about public safety, the broad con-
sensus today that we are over-incarcerating, the overall evidence of 
historically modest and stable levels of crime today, and the further 
crime-risk-reducing potential of services and supervision that could 
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be built into and accompany the beneficiaries of an amnesty, sug-
gests the danger to public safety of a broad amnesty would be mod-
est.184 
B.   The Potential Benefits of an Amnesty Approach 
Above, I’ve argued that this is an appropriate time in American 
history to overcome our normally justifiable antipathy to general 
criminal amnesties. Mass incarceration is such a significant aberra-
tion from our traditions and values that an amnesty now would pose 
little danger of becoming a regular or highly politicized feature of 
our criminal justice system (neither of which would be desirable, 
and both of which would be a potential disaster of its own). Here, I 
want to emphasize the significant benefits of an amnesty law, not 
just to its direct beneficiaries, but also to the broader community. 
1.   ENDING PRISON OVERCROWDING AND DEGRADING TREATMENT 
The chronic overcrowding in many state and federal prisons that 
puts prisoners in danger of degrading treatment also endangers com-
munities.185 A substantial body of empirical evidence now shows 
that when people experience respect for their human dignity from 
authorities, their motivation to obey the law goes up, but when they 
feel that their dignity is disrespected, it goes down.186 Chronic over-
crowding, with its resulting lockdowns, failures to deliver needed 
medical care, and inability to support family visits and other positive 
ways to occupy time, inevitably results in a perception that authori-
ties disrespect the human dignity of prisoners and can be expected 
                                                                                                             
 184 As noted above, many concerns that California’s Correctional Realignment 
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 185 See Federal Prison Overcrowding Endangering Staff, Inmates, Report 
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to diminish the motivation of prisoners exposed to degrading treat-
ment to obey the law in the future.187 Little wonder that contempo-
rary recidivism rates are so historically high.188 
2.   PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Not only would amnesty reduce the negative effect of degrading 
treatment on prisoners, it would itself constitute a large and concen-
trated dose of procedural justice.189 For prisoners who may have 
only experienced the state and its actors in procedures aimed at pun-
ishing and harming them, the very process of being released early, 
having disabilities lifted, and being reintegrated into their commu-
nities could produce a powerful motivational force for change. The 
same is true for the children and relatives of returning prisoners, who 
will likely experience a positive effect of law that may improve the 
legitimacy of the legal system in their eyes and raise their motivation 
to comply with it. 
3.   DE-BULKING MASS INCARCERATION AHEAD OF SENTENCING 
REFORM 
Perhaps the biggest caution that emerges from an examination 
of European amnesty practice190 is that hopes for reforming the 
criminal justice system may rise and fall with the actual amnesty, 
producing no lasting structural changes and inevitably a resumption 
of overcrowding.191 In order to avoid that, sentencing reform has to 
be part of the goal. Amnesty should be seen not as an alternative to 
sentencing reform or as a way to delay it, but instead as a supplement 
designed to reduce the powerful presumptions in favor of law en-
forcement and against the criminalized, which if left in place are 
likely to dramatically reduce the scope of any successful reforms. 
Given the current scale of the system, and the powerful resistance to 
a significant downsizing of the scale that will inevitably be mounted 
by those whose power or economic interests are currently tied up 
with the system, there is a grave danger that a small reduction in 
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overall incarceration will be accepted as enough and mass incarcer-
ation will be declared officially over. 
It is in this respect that amnesty can be a powerful prelude to a 
period of sentencing reform. By radically altering the current scale 
of the system, even before the political trade-offs, or “log-rolling” 
inevitable in a sentencing reform process begins, there is a greater 
chance that the new sentencing structures will aim at stabilizing the 
system at a much reduced scale of incarceration. As a highly visible 
repudiation of the punishment decisions made by prosecutors, am-
nesty will also deal a direct political blow to the organized prosecu-
torial lobby, which currently has great power at the state and federal 
level of law making.192 
4.   CREATING A LEGAL RENUNCIATION OF MASS INCARCERATION 
Paradoxically, the very rarity of ordinary criminal amnesties in 
American history could serve to help mark mass incarceration as an 
aberration in American correctional history, like the convict lease 
system or the solitary confinement system of the early 19th cen-
tury—not to be repeated. The fact that solitary confinement has re-
turned is a reminder that public memory, and not just professional 
consensus, is essential to keeping bad practices down.193 Elsewhere, 
I have argued that states that engaged in mass incarceration should 
amend their constitutions to officially repudiate it.194 But amending 
constitutions is very difficult to do, typically requiring a super ma-
jority of 2/3 of lawmakers, or of citizens where they are allowed to 
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amend the constitution by ballot.195 Amnesty, which could be 
achieved in the majority of states by executive action or everywhere 
by a simple legislative majority supported by the governor, would 
serve much the same signaling function as a constitutional amend-
ment. While it would lack the enduring influence on judicial en-
forcement of rights, amnesties would also have an immediate effect 
on prisons and prison conditions that constitutional amendments 
could only impact over a prolonged time. 
C.   Costs of an Amnesty 
Naturally, any action that terminates or shortens so many legally 
adequate sentences raises serious worries about the impact on public 
safety and on respect for law. I already addressed why mass incar-
ceration should cause us to be less worried about this, but I will ad-
dress the criticisms head on. 
1.   DETERRENCE 
How much the threat of imprisonment, if convicted of a crime, 
can deter people is a subject of some controversy.196 An amnesty 
might undermine whatever deterrent threat there is by raising the 
prospect of early release. But, however much the prospect of an am-
nesty undermines deterrence, economists who have studied actual 
amnesties believe that they probably enhance deterrence on the 
grounds that once an amnesty is put into effect, the prospect of an-
other one is considerably lessened for the near term.197 Should am-
nesties become a regular recurring phenomenon every few years, as 
they were in Germany during the Weimar period, deterrence might 
be undermined.198 Italy reformed its laws to require a 2/3 vote of the 
parliament to declare an amnesty; a shift that greatly reduced their 
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frequency.199 Given the extreme rarity of non-military amnesties in 
the U.S.,200 an amnesty targeted at reducing the prison overcrowding 
caused by mass incarceration is unlikely to be repeated. 
An amnesty or general pardon may actually be the best way to 
optimize deterrence and reduce recidivism. Economists studying the 
Italian amnesty found that the enhancement in sentences for future 
crimes faced by prisoners benefitting from amnesty reduced the re-
cidivism rates of those facing the longest enhancement.201 Research 
on incarceration and recidivism has shown that longer times spent 
incarcerated are associated with high recidivism rates.202 By reduc-
ing the incarceration effect and increasing deterrence, amnesty may 
be a powerful tool to reduce crime. The primary economic rebuttal 
is that these positive effects are overwhelmed by the reduction in 
incapacitation produced by releasing a large number of people with 
a propensity to commit future crimes who would otherwise have 
been outside of the community. 
2.   INCAPACITATION 
Because people in prison have a proven past propensity to com-
mit crimes, it is reasonable to expect an amnesty to increase the 
number of people free in the community with a propensity to com-
mit crime through a reduction in the incapacitation effect of impris-
onment.203 Crime did rise after Italy’s 2006 amnesty, particularly 
thefts,204 and 22 percent of the amnestied prisoners were convicted 
of a new crime despite the deterrent effects noted above.205 
But while a U.S. amnesty may also lead to some additional 
crimes, there is reason to believe it will be a modest increase. First, 
California’s Correctional Realignment has been carefully studied 
during its first years, and a modest increase in crime, especially 
property crimes like auto thefts, has been detected.206 This may be 
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because California, and the U.S. generally, has been enjoying his-
torically low levels of crime—patterns that include former prison-
ers.207 While incapacitation theory posits that propensity to commit 
crimes is a variable intrinsic to the individual, other criminologists 
believe that criminal behavior by former prisoners is subject to many 
of the same situational factors that seem to have reduced crime gen-
erally.208 
Moreover, Italy released prisoners in the 2006 amnesty without 
providing any support or supervision for these former prisoners.209 
Amnesty laws in the U.S. can and should be designed to assure that 
released prisoners are provided services and supervision through pa-
role or probation agencies. As in California’s realignment, addi-
tional funds should be provided to these agencies to take on the ad-
ditional burden.210 While a large portion of the Italian releases took 
place within the first month,211 an amnesty law should be designed 
to stagger releases so as to avoid overwhelming supervision agen-
cies. 
3.   UNDERMINING RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW 
An amnesty is undeniably a suspension of a certain portion of 
the law as it stands at the moment just before the amnesty. It cannot 
help then but deal a blow to the rule of law.212 When amnesties are 
repeated frequently, that risk becomes a near certainty. This sug-
gests, however, not that societies with respect for the rule of law 
never engage in amnesty, but that they do so only under three con-
ditions. First, when a crisis has emerged in some sector of the state 
or civil society, which renders continued adherence to the existing 
rules pointless and destructive. Second, when forces that support an 
amnesty do so as part of a concerted political effort to rework the 
institutions that have led to the present crisis. And third, when the 
amnesty itself is carried out as much as possible in conformity with 
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the spirit of the rule of law.213 The present crises in criminal justice 
and crimmigration meet the first of these requirements. President 
Obama’s order suspending deportation for certain categories214 
meets the second and third requirements, and so would properly im-
plemented criminal amnesties to end overcrowding in the federal 
and state prison systems. 
Crises, whether brought about purely by governmental policies, 
like mass incarceration or crimmigration, or created through a com-
bination of policies and private economic practices, like the global 
financial crisis that broke out in 2008,215 often have the result of 
turning the previous system of legal rules into a cage, trapping tens 
of thousands of ordinary people and rendering it impossible for them 
to return to social or economic viability. Think of the national hous-
ing market seized by collapsing prices and an unwillingness of cred-
itors to lend.216 Insisting on keeping the cage locked in the name of 
the rule of law is the purest kind of triumph of formalism. Bailouts 
(in the financial world) and amnesties in the penal or crimmigration 
realms represent law-based mechanisms for restoring the ability of 
individuals and whole communities to resume their lives in accord-
ance with the law.217 Often, the only alternative is to leave those 
individuals and whole communities to lives outside of the law—a 
prospect that could hardly be considered good for the rule of law. 
Mass incarceration is as powerful an example of this sort of cri-
sis as we have in contemporary times.218 While the offense defini-
tions and sentencing provisions that have resulted in chronic over-
crowding may mostly conform to the rule of law in a procedural 
sense, they have operated in a manner increasingly incompatible 
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with both the substantive and procedural aspects of justice. Most 
importantly, continued fealty to those particular sentences is sub-
jecting fellow citizens to the continued risk of torture, inhumane, 
and degrading conditions in prison, in violation of the higher law of 
the Constitution. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that states enacting an amnesty 
to end prison overcrowding will follow up with sentencing reform, 
just as there is no guarantee that the Obama administration will be 
able to follow up its temporary order with a comprehensive immi-
gration reform, but such states offer reasonable and promising 
chances to alter the climate and context which has stymied structural 
reforms up to now. 
Amnesty also looks to be a less serious challenge to the rule of 
law than the other key feature built into our legal tradition for re-
sponding to instances of legal but overly harsh punishment—jury 
nullification.219 The latter is an ex-ante opportunity for a jury of or-
dinary citizens to avoid the punishment by finding the defendant 
“not guilty” despite evidence that establishes beyond a reasonable 
doubt the elements of the crime.220 Both have been viewed with 
much disfavor.221 Yet, America’s experience with harsh punishment 
and mass incarceration is causing a much-needed reconsideration of 
both. 
Professor Paul Butler has called for something like “mass jury 
nullification” by urging jurors to decline to convict people charged 
with non-violent drug crimes who face harsh punishments.222 While 
both have their problems and virtues, amnesty offers a better vehicle 
for accomplishing steep reductions in punishment with less damage 
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to the integrity of the legal system. Jury nullification, even if justifi-
able as a form of resistance to mass incarceration, is unlikely to be-
come common enough to reduce incarceration rates significantly,223 
nor would it do anything for those suffering from being incarcerated 
now under degrading conditions of overcrowding. Furthermore, 
while jury nullification tends to be invisible or have low visibility, 
and is rarely subject to public debate,224 an amnesty would be ex-
tremely visible and the executives who had the courage to imple-
ment it would surely have the legitimacy of the amnesty challenged 
in the very next election. 
Bringing amnesty as close as possible to the rule of law means 
that the amnesties themselves must be principled and procedurally 
fair,225 and the implementation process must seriously strive to min-
imize any harms the amnesty may bring. Thus, a bad example of 
implementation was the Italian general pardon of 2006, which took 
place without any effort by the Italian state to aid provinces in which 
particularly high numbers of prisoners would be returning without 
services or supervision.226 
CONCLUSION: AMNESTY AND CIVILIZATION 
Amnesties have long played a role in managing the prison pop-
ulations of advanced legal systems in Europe.227 In the United 
States, they have generally been limited to clearing the system of 
prisoners and cases involving war-related violations after the war 
has been completed.228 Mass incarceration, and the chronic over-
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crowding it has led to, present a compelling occasion for an excep-
tion to this American tradition. Limited by the powerful presump-
tions of the dangerousness of the prison population and of confi-
dence in prosecutorial discretion, conventional means like individ-
ual pardons or clemency, parole, or good time credit extensions 
simply cannot clear the backlog or put the nation in a strong position 
to structurally reform its sentencing laws. Only amnesties can re-
duce the prison populations rapidly enough to end the degrading 
conditions caused by overcrowding and diminish the powerful penal 
ideology that prevents substantial reform. 
While amnesties may seem an outrageous departure from the 
rule of law, it is truly that status quo that constitutes the outrage. All 
approaches designed to be cautious methods of reducing prison 
overcrowding presume that the existing state of affairs is a legally 
tolerable state of affairs; but it is not. Plata contained a clear mes-
sage that it is not tolerable to give states time to address overcrowd-
ing and medical and mental health problems at a pace affordable and 
desirable to the state. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Brown v. Plata: 
“A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including ad-
equate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dig-
nity and has no place in civilized society.”229 The choice is now be-
tween amnesty and barbarism. 
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